ASME NQA.TR:2020 pdf download

ASME NQA.TR:2020 pdf download Evolution of Quality Assurance Principles and Requirements in the U.S. Nuclear Industry
In 2013,NNSA replaced Qc-1 with NNSA NAP-24.NAP-24 restructured Qc-1 into the standard DoE directiveformat. lt referenced the NNSA supplemental and DOEdirectives for control of measuring and test equipmentand records rather than explicitly including these require-ments. Additionally, DOE O 414.1D,Attachment 4,replaced the software quality requirements for safety-and weapons-related software previously in QC-1.
NAP-24 was revised in 2015 to include Attachment 3,which defined common processes and activities for thefederal and NNSA contractor (both design agencies andproduction agencies) weapon quality organizations,employing a layered oversight approach involving Head-quarters Weapon Quality Division, field / productionoffices,and NNSA contractors and subcontractors.
1.3 AEC NAVAL REACTORS,AEC QRC-82C
Quality control requirements for AEC naval nuclearpropulsion programs were prescribed in AEC QRC-82C.This document supplemented MIL-Q-9858A by imposingquality control requirements for material inspection andtesting during manufacturing of naval reactor compo-nents.
1.4 AEC To DOE RDT F2-2T STANDARD
From its beginning, the AEC managed and operated itscivilian reactor and technology development programs asa decentralized agency.AEC headquarters developedpolicy, managed funding, and issued broad programmaticdirection to its field organizations.The AEC issued grantsto universities, national laboratories, and research anddevelopment contractors.
Notwithstanding the good operational safety records inthe late 1960s,AEC RDT management and engineers weredisturbed to note that important civilian reactor and tech-nology development objectives were not being accom-plished as planned. Quality problems,includingequipment failures and irretrievable loss of importantdata, were attributed not to the inherent risks of tech-nology development but to insufficient managementand engineering attention to conventional material andprocess controls. Fundamental, exacting engineeringstan-dards and quality controls that were essential to tech-nology development were not being applied.
Early AEc,DOE, and contractor project managementmisconceptions about quality assurance included thefollowing:
(a) Some project managers believed it was possible toensure nuclear facility quality without a formal, docu-mented, and integrated quality assurance program.While this approach was used for small basic research reactors, quality-related operating problems resulted in shutting down production reactors at most DOE sites and prevented their restart.
(b) Some projectmanagers believed thatqualityassur- ance program establishmentand implementation was the primary responsibility and role of the quality assurance organization. This misconception was fostered in part by some quality assurance organizations that believed that the quality assurance plans, requirements, and proce- dures were written by and for the quality assurance or- ganization. Theyfailed to recognize a fundamental quality assurance principle that quality and its achievement are primary management responsibilities; the quality assur- ance organization supports top and line management in executing their quality assurance programs and by conducting independent audits.
Prior to 1968, there were no formal quality assurance requirements imposed by the AEC and its management and operating contractors on GOCO nuclear facilities conducting reactor development and technology activ- ities. This situation presented an early quality manage- ment dichotomy for the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) quality engineers who had technical and quality management oversight of some joint AEC–NASA space exploration programs. For example, in the mid-1960s, NASA’s Space Nuclear Auxiliary Power (SNAP) programs imposed rigorous quality assurance and quality control requirements from NASANHB 5300.4(1B) on some ofits prime contrac- tors,e.g.,AerojetGeneralinAzusa,CA,andGeneralElectric inEvendale, OH. InMIL-I-45208A, NASAdelegatedto DOD Air Force, Navy, and other contract administration agen- cies certain DOD inspection system requirements fornon- nuclear, non-mission-critical components of the power conversion system being developed by the contractor. NASA quality assurance program managers were disap- pointed to learn that the AEC did not impose any formal quality assurance or quality control requirements on the SNAP reactor-system-development contractors. The Associate Director at NASA’s Lewis Research Center brought this situation to the attention of the joint AEC–NASA organization.